HNSPS
Paper I/2 (Rev. 1) (1967)

Sorry to have missed you.
Would like to get your
thoughts on any
problems
with publication,
But I hope not
to return to D.C.
in near future.
So if you have
any views, I'd
be interested,
by letter or
phone.
Sincerely,
Bill Harris

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A Bibliography with Selected Annotations

William R. Harris, Editor
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Preliminary Draft, Revised, 1967

Not for Citation or Quotation

Acknowledgments

Among the many persons offering suggestions for this bibliography were Professor Paul W. Blackstock, on leave from the University of South Carolina; Robert D. Crane of the Hudson Institute; Robert Jervis of Harvard's Center for International Affairs; Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton's Center of International Studies; Professor W. Barton Leach of the Harvard Law School; Andrew W. Marshall and Richard R. Nelson of the RAND Corporation; J. Francis Rendall of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies; Professor Thomas C. Schelling and Gene Sharp of Harvard's Center for International Affairs; Professor Louis B. Sohn of the Harvard Law School; and Professor and Mrs. Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago.

Of special assistance were Barton Whaley of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies, who put his file cards at my disposal, and Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University (who previously taught a forerunner of my section of the Harvard National Security Policy Seminar) whose criticisms and suggestions on the preliminary draft resulted in some changes and many additions.

Many others have been helpful, in drawing my attention to suspect or unreliable materials, or to obscure works which I had overlooked. I wish to thank them generically, if not by name. Among them are students in the Harvard National Security Policy Seminar.

Robert C. Schnitz of Harvard College assisted by translating passages and titles from a variety of Russian texts, and Misses Linda J. Barker and Elizabeth W. Jones, both of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, were invaluable in filing, typing, and editing the voluminous and sometimes tedious material which follows.

I alone bear responsibility for the selections and annotations which follow, notwithstanding the valuable assistance which I have received. It is hoped that the collection and organization of these materials will prove of use, despite many errors which inevitably remain.

W. R. H.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgments ii

PART I: AN INTRODUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction v
A Critique of the Literature vi

PART II: BIBLIOGRAPHICAL TOPICS

1. Bibliographies 1
2. Clandestine Intelligence 3
3. Clandestine Operations 17
4. Communications Intelligence and Security 41
5. Deception 48
6. Economics of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence . . 53
7. Electronic Intelligence 57
8. Erroneous Intelligence, Causes of, ... 61
9. Ethics and Morality 78
10. Information Management 81
11. Intelligence Analysis and Estimating 91
12. Intelligence and Policy-Making 96
13. Intelligence Control 109
14. Intelligence, Inspection and Arms Control 112
15. Legal Aspects of Intelligence Activities 120
16. Organization and Oversight 135
17. Paper Mills and Forgeries, Disinformation, Propaganda and Psywar 167
18. Paramilitary and Resistance Operations 201
19. Personnel Policies 223
20. Public Information and Security Considerations 231
21. Public Relations 243
22. Scientific and Technical Intelligence 252
23. Security, Counter-Intelligence, and Counter-Espionage. 256
24. Strategic Intelligence 277
25. Strategy and Intelligence Options 293
26. Tactical Intelligence 295
27. Technological Innovations 301

PART I: AN INTRODUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The following bibliography originated with a survey of the literature on "Intelligence and National Security" which I conducted in May 1966, following arrangements to teach a section of the Harvard National Security Policy Seminar during the 1966-1967 academic year. A preliminary scanning of the literature available in the Harvard library system indicated that the bulk of the public works were of poor quality; that only a minor segment of the relevant literature was grouped together in the Widener stacks (inappropriately, under the "War" category), or in the International Law Library of the Harvard Law School; and that no comprehensive bibliography existed, excepting an obsolete State Department compilation of 1948-1949.

This bibliography has several purposes. Firstly, it is prepared for my students, so as to enable them to find some of the more esoteric works on intelligence, and to identify problem-areas for research papers. Secondly, it is prepared for scholars of intelligence activities, in the hope that a systematic presentation of some relevant literature might encourage more thoughtful writing than is presently available in the public domain. Thirdly, it is prepared for government officials and private citizens concerned with the effective operation and supervision of the U.S. intelligence community and its necessarily secret activities within an essentially open society.

It was with some hesitation that I decided upon any dissemination of this bibliography beyond my students and a few trusted colleagues. A number of the recent books on intelligence evince an inability to evaluate critically the often less-than-reliable source materials. One of the more notable is Andrew Tully's CIA, The Inside Story, an "outside story" by a reporter who lifted his materials (without proper footnoting) from a wide range of sources, frequently unreliable ones. Another is The Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, unfair to the intelligence community and even more unjust to those charged with its close supervision. Although I feared that this bibliography, in the hands of unscrupulous or infantile journalists, might

encourage a further outpouring of harmful materials, I hoped that the value of encouraging scholarly works on important but often neglected subjects would outweigh — if not in pounds of page-print, at least in significance — some slight addition to the nearly saturated market of intelligence sensationalism. The next few years will tell whether my optimism is justified.

This bibliography is far from comprehensive; its length may suggest the vast outpouring of works, many useless and many nearly useless. I have attempted to eliminate the totally useless works, while including most of the nearly useless ones which offer at least a scintilla of relevant fact or reflection. Such distinctions are difficult, and no doubt I have made many errors of selection. I considered among the "totally useless" works many accounts of clandestine or covert intelligence collection, especially those which failed to convey the elements of "tradecraft," personality, organization, supervision, and technique. I considered among the "nearly useless" many of the less reliable surveys of intelligence activities; the reader is cautioned against relying upon many of these works, included in this bibliography for whatever slight contributions they offer. Examples of unreliability are Robert Hayden Alcorn's No Bugles for Spies, Tales of the OSS and Ford Corey & Alastair MacBain's Cloak and Dagger; the Secret Story of the OSS. There are other volumes which are of disappointing quality; those which claim to detail recent and obviously highly secret events are frequently among the less reliable volumes. Critical reading and careful cross-checking of data will assist readers in their appraisal of the works which follow. A possible exercise in critical evaluation might be a survey of the "Paper Mills and Forgeries, Disinformation, Propaganda, and Psywar" section, which contains a wide range of materials requiring careful scrutiny. Wherever I have detected a possibility of utility, I have sought to include a volume in this bibliography, leaving it to the reader to review his sources with a critical eye.

Even more difficult than the process of selection has been the process of annotation. Never having worked for any intelligence organization, I lack the background data

necessary to evaluate many of the volumes which I have included. Because of my limited background data, and the frequently disappointing quality of the literature, I have chosen not to annotate each work included in the following pages. Instead, I have annotated only those works which appeared to contribute significant data or reflective thought. All annotated materials have an asterisk (*) preceding the entry in question. A few entries have asterisks (*) but no annotations; these works are ones upon which I have previously commented or works which appear to be significant but about which I do not feel qualified to offer a comment, either because I have only skim-read them or because after reading them I still consider myself unqualified to offer an evaluation. Some of the works without asterisks are of high quality, but, in my view, tangential to central themes or problems of intelligence activities.

To date, I have not included works of fiction on this bibliography, though many of the works included as non-fiction are sufficiently inaccurate and imaginative to qualify as fiction. Many works of fiction provide useful data or impressions; if it is feasible, a "fiction" supplement will be included with this bibliography, in a later stage.

In the hope of encouraging research and writing on important topics, previously neglected or inadequately treated, I am offering the following critique of the public literature on intelligence and national security. Where I have failed to locate relevant materials, my critique may under-estimate the value of materials already available.

A Critique of the Literature

1. Bibliographies

The present bibliographical compilation arose from a review of those previously available; obviously I was not satisfied, or I would not have embarked upon this arduous task. The best general bibliography on intelligence was the two-part State Department compilation, obsolete and of limited utility because of its cautious and exceedingly brief annotations. Professor Ransom's bibliography, with its useful and reasonable annotations, would suffice as a basic introductory guide to the literature as of 1957; his revised edition, when available, should include a more helpful bibliography as the result of his careful research, a further outpouring of material, and the availability of this bibliography. Another general bibliography, Mr. Dakan's PACAF compilation, is disappointing, at least through the 1965 edition, though improvements may be in the offing for future editions. It is filled with extraneous material, some of the "paper mill" species, and so charitable to the authors as to be of slight use to his readers.

The Hammond bibliography on communism is exceedingly useful, and Mr. Slusser's contribution on Soviet espionage is judicious. Another specialized bibliography, the CIA's 84 page edition on Mr. Dulles, helps to collect some of the periodical literature; it is probably more helpful respecting CIA than the career of Mr. Dulles, largely because the literature on Mr. Dulles (Allen, not Foster) is superficial, or propagandistic. Three distinguished bibliographies cover the field of paramilitary and resistance activities: the thoughtful volume by M. Michel, that by Mr. Foot, and the voluminous work on counterinsurgency by American University. The Berger and Reese edition on psychological warfare is thorough, and only slightly obsolete.

Two subjects appearing to lack adequate bibliographies are (i) the press, public relations, and security considerations, a problematic area for the next decades, and one

treated inadequately in section 20, below; and (ii) security, counter-intelligence, and counter-espionage, which lacks a good bibliography, and perhaps significantly, which lacks much serious writing, in toto. Espionage fiction, with its wide range of quality and recent commercial exploitation, sorely needs a good bibliography which, if undertaken with care and by a person with sufficient expertise, could provide valuable experiences of tradecraft, reflections, and insights frequently lacking in the non-fiction works.

2. Clandestine Intelligence

The literature on clandestine intelligence collection is disappointing, largely, one suspects, because legitimate security considerations preclude the more knowledgeable from reflecting in public on their tradecraft. Included in this section are works respecting both "clandestine" and "covert" activities, the latter usually involving elements of the former. A reading of relevant pieces of fiction or quasi-fiction would supplement the paltry non-fiction menu.

This subject appears to be one of the least auspicious for scholarly works; one possible effort might be an evaluation of clandestine intelligence requirements and the political tensions generated in the acquisitory process; another might be a study of how technological innovations or "selective information transfer" agreements, tacit or formal, might alleviate some of these otherwise inevitable tensions.

3. Clandestine Operations

The literature on clandestine operations is rich in source material, particularly in case studies. Almost all of these works suffer from the inaccessibility of primary source materials, and the frequent unreliability of available secondary source materials. The scholar's task is, therefore, an exceedingly difficult one. Some have chosen the commercial exploitation of this subject, in the absence of reliable source material; others have chosen the commercial exploitation

of this subject, in the presence of reliable source materials, but without adequate reflection; others would appear to know the facts, but to distort them in the hope of attracting attention and sales. The utmost care is required in the use of these materials; the proper employment of them could yield some interesting results.

Despite the availability of some fine case studies, the literature lacks an incisive analysis of the political theory of clandestine operations; it also lacks a comprehensive theoretical exposition, despite the admirable attempt of Professor Scott, in The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration, and the contributions of Professor Blackstock in The Strategy of Subversion. Professor Scott's volume, the best available, fails to explore fully the relationship between the covert or informal penetrations and the overt relations among states. It fails to assess the over-all impact on the international community, the effects upon international organizations, the interrelations in arms control agreements, or potential substitutional techniques for the molding of social change.

4. Communications Intelligence and Security

The public literature on communications intelligence and security is exceedingly poor, fortunately so, for the communications arena is one of unending competition between offense and defense and among nations. Noteworthy contributions are those of Mr. Dulles, Mr. Foot, Mrs. Wohlstetter, and, despite the passage of time, Mr. Yardley. David Kahn's forthcoming book on cryptology, though a worrisome item, may be a disappointment, and thus not too damaging.

The available materials are insufficient for any authoritative work, and none would be advisable. Nonetheless, scholars of communications might wish to explore the effects of exotic or compartmentalized information upon decision-making processes, upon the roles of the executive branch, the press, the public, and the congress in foreign policy formulation. Or, an exploration of the effects of compartmentalization, of internal disinformation or distortion of information,

might be possible, in conjunction with an examination of the literature on "Deception," on "Erroneous Intelligence," in "Information Management," and on "Public Information and Security Considerations." One pioneering study is Mrs. Wohlstetter's volume on Pearl Harbor, which might serve as a stimulus for additional case studies, and more ambitiously, for a general disquisition on information compartmentalization and channeling.

5. Deception

Although the present collection of deception operations is only a small sampling of available materials, it may suffice to indicate the importance of the subject. Mr. Dulles' chapter, "Confusing the Adversary," is a quick introduction, and Professor Blackstock's lurid little volume, Agents of Deceit, contains several case studies, including protagonist and intra-alliance examples. Michael Foot's volume includes numerous instances of deception, and Ewen Montagu's account is an enjoyable tale (which became an enjoyable movie). The Horelick and Rush volume covers an important, economically significant subject, but without shedding much light on the nature of deception operations, or the nature of the particular deception operation under scrutiny. Other observers view the "missile gap" exploitation as unpremeditated -- as encouraged by Western overreaction to Soviet technological advances, and thereafter seized upon by Soviet politicians. The Horelick and Rush account is far from definitive. As for the remaining works in this section, most are of slight consequence, a few of possible interest.

A study of strategic deception, with perhaps a chapter on tactical deception, could be a significant contribution to the literature. To what degree are deceptions and other obfuscating techniques instrumental in the production of erroneous intelligence? To what degree is the press employed, knowingly or not, in deception operations in various countries, and what are the consequences of such exploitation for the press and public, for the balance between executive and legislative branches of government, for foreign antagonists, allies, and internal public opinion?

6. Economics of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

It is with some trepidation that I venture any thoughts at all on the subject of economics. My layman's impression is that the study of the economics of information is still in one of the early stages of infancy --- which stage it is impossible for me, a non-economist, to judge. Compounding these weaknesses is the fact that studies on the economics of intelligence systems are generally outside the public domain. The student of information economics must look to analyses of the raisin industry, or the Lassie television program for the theoretical tools presently available. The present collection of literature is hardly satisfactory, in part because it is an incomplete collection.

There is little in the present compilation or in the literature on game theory which incorporates, among the variables and matrix choices, the option to withhold information, though some models include the option to acquire information. The generation of models demonstrating some commensurability between intelligence and counter-intelligence might provide a more realistic exposition of the available options; it might aid counter-intelligence and security planners in allocating scarce resources to those sectors from which the withholding of certain information would prove especially costly to an adversary; it might aid in establishing more sensible guidelines for press and media restraints; and, in conjunction with studies on the economics of deception, it might provide guidance for priorities and targets useful in deception planning. Finally, more sophisticated economic models might improve the allocation of resources in the acquisition of positive intelligence, or, in counter-deception activities.

7. Electronic Intelligence

Like the communications intelligence and security materials, some of which are germane to this topic, the collected materials are superficial and spotty in coverage, a fact which is impressive in terms of security and/or discretion on the part of the press. The Schlesinger volume is of some interest, and Colonel

Bulatov's article in Krasnaya Zveda /Red Star/, "What is Radioelectronic War?" provides a more informative introduction than usually emerges from the overt Soviet press. Mr. Carroll's recent Secrets of Electronic Espionage draws upon materials overlooked in this bibliography, but his volume is hardly comprehensive and fails to divulge the secrets promised in the title.

As with the communications intelligence materials, these are sufficiently weak to discourage scholarly inquiry. The growing public interest in electronic intelligence may result in further volumes on this subject, but in view of security requirements, technical discussions may remain at a primitive level. Senator Long's inquiries into possible invasions of privacy, President Johnson's call for the establishment of more comprehensive legal controls, and the recent Kennedy-Hoover round robin highlight the need for further reflection and study of non-technical aspects and consequences of electronic intelligence capabilities.

8. Erroneous Intelligence, Causes of

The material on this subject is rich and varied, offering myriad examples, aspects, perspectives and causes for those interested in cognitive and analytical processes. Four sets of failures in strategic intelligence prediction have received serious attention: Scandinavian failures to predict the German invasion of April 9, 1940; Soviet and other failures to predict the launching of Operation BARBAROSSA on June 22, 1941; the American failure to anticipate Pearl Harbor; and various misperceptions concerning the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Noteworthy contributions on April 9, 1940 are the books by Midgaard and Svensson, the article by Holst, and the paper by Einhorn. A number of the relevant contributions on Operation BARBAROSSA are cited in the critiques by Ainsztein ("Stalin and June 22, 1941") and by Colonel Maslov ("The Literature on the Military Operations in the Summer of 1941"). The heavy responsibility of then-General Zhukov and especially of Stalin himself have retarded the disclosure of basic source material required for a study of June 22nd. Khrushchev's disclosures in February 1956 inaugurated a series of revelations, including those in the official history (IVOVSS), in

the accounts of Anfilov (1962) and Nekrich (1965), in the memoirs of Berezhkov (1965) and, foremost of all in the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov (1965). Other memoirs, currently underway, may shed further light on these events. In contrast, a wide array of source materials on Pearl Harbor has been available since the publication of thirty-nine volumes of the Pearl Harbor investigation, in 1946. Not until Mrs. Wohlstetter's pioneering work (1963), were these materials exploited properly. More recently (1966) Dr. Pogue has contributed an authoritative chapter on the subject, and Mr. Farago, whose past work requires skeptical reading and frequent disbelief, promises breath-taking revelations. On the Cuban missile crisis, the Wohlstetters, Mr. Abel, Mr. Crane, Dr. Horelick, Dr. Kent, Professor Knorr, and shortly Professor Hilsman (Chap. 17, "The Intelligence Post-Mortem: Who Erred?"), inter alia, inaugurate the assessment of Cuba II.

Two other sets of events have received more than passing attention: the Korean War and the Dominican intervention of 1965. The Appleton volume (1961), the De Weerd paper (1962), the Marshall history (1953), and possibly the de Rivera analysis (1967) tackle the Korean situation. The most notable contribution may be the Whiting volume (1960), and it, like the others, suffers from thoroughly inadequate materials on North Korean, Communist Chinese, and Soviet thinking. On the Dominican intervention, the Beaulac report from Georgetown University (1966) and Martin memoirs (1966) may be contrasted with the accounts of Draper (1965 & 1966), Evans & Novak (1966), Geyelin (1966), Roberts (1965), and the highly-placed leak to The New York Times (April 24, 1966). The proximity of these events and understandable sensitivity of the participants on various sides may preclude authoritative analysis of these events until the fermentation has ceased and the wine is readied for bottling. Even the best of enologists has difficulty in judging the young wine.

Additional case studies could enlarge the set of examples so useful for the development of a general theory; each of the better case studies of the past has suggested a fascinating diversity of possible causes, and further studies might enlarge

the search for causes. Messrs. Hilsman, Kennan, Kent, and Wraga have examined possible threads interwoven with some regularity in Soviet errors; Messrs. Crane, de Rivera, and Wasserman have attempted to uncover the patterns and causes of erroneous prediction, with only limited success. The Wasserman article ("The Failure of Intelligence Prediction") succumbs to one of the pitfalls, the generation of theories from a frequently inaccurate data base. Simultaneous attack on this problem through classified government and unclassified university media might advance the rather primitive state of knowledge on this obviously important subject. University social scientists have been remarkably neglectful in the past; aside from their possibly significant assistance to their governments, they might find such inquiries a stimulus to an understanding of their disciplines. Political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, economists, and management specialists, among others, might profit from an examination of erroneous prediction, its nature, its products, and its causes.

9. Ethics and Morality

One student has commented that the "ethics and morality" section in this intelligence bibliography is unusually thin. One reason may be the difficulties in relating these considerations to the specifics of intelligence tradecraft, and the frustrations, occasioning despondency on the part of some, in so doing. One particular weakness of this section is its failure to include many of the French writings occasioned by French involvement in Algeria during the 1950's. However difficult it may be to integrate these considerations with action decisions, the importance of attempting such an integration should be obvious. Because this bibliography is organized along functional lines, it may appear to blur differences of style, of means, and of objectives of the various nation states. But it does not intentionally blur these distinctions, as Sanche de Gramont (The Secret War), Andrew Tully (CIA, The Inside Story), and David Wise & Thomas B. Ross (The Invisible Government) appear to do. These differences of means and ends may be found in the literature; considerations of ethics and morality may assist in perpetuating

them. Thus, thoughtful works will remain of interest and importance in international affairs. They should be encouraged.

10. Information Management

The literature on automatic or electronic data processing is large, and the outpouring of superficial analyses is constant.

The modern technology's effect on specific fields of intelligence, and governmental organization of intelligence activities deserve greater attention. The various techniques of controlling and structuring the flow of information, and the consequences of various choices, are matters requiring more vigorous investigation. Some of the literature on deception, organization, public information and security considerations, security, and technological innovations may be relevant.

11. Intelligence Analysis and Estimating

Much of the literature in this bibliography provides a few thoughts on the processes of analysis and estimating; few articles or books provide more than a few thoughts. Opinions on the matter vary; mine is that none of the books is satisfactory as a general text on the subject, perhaps because of the job's complexity and the crude inroads of human organizations in tackling it. Adopting the three-star scale of the Michelin guides, most of the literature belongs amidst the fork-and-knife symbolism. Dr. Kent's Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949) is the only candidate for the two-star category, and with the passage of time it would benefit by revisions and additions reflecting alterations in the intelligence process in an era of science and intelligence hardware. It would benefit by an exploration of future technologies, intelligence requirements and directions. Other noteworthy volumes are those by McGovern, Pettee, Platt (1957; 1959; 1961), and Zlotnick, all of which are disappointing, and that by Orlov which is especially

disappointing. The American literature is hardly satisfying, but the foreign literature is almost non-existent. Security considerations may restrain most knowledgeable writers, for discussion of doctrine, theory and technique may be readily translated into improved intelligence performance.

An outstanding book on intelligence processes and the roles of strategic intelligence would fill the present void, but the task of writing such a volume may appear more facile than it would, in fact, be.

12. Intelligence and Policy-Making

Source materials and observations on the relationships between substantive intelligence and policy-making, and on the roles of intelligence organizations in policy execution are plentiful. Useful sources include Mr. Abel's book on Cuba II, various of the Alsop brothers' articles, the Blackstock volumes (1964; 1966), Mr. Dulles' volume (1963), some of Mr. Allan Evans' articles ("Intelligence and Policy Formation"; "Research in Action"), parts of the "Felix" volume, parts of the Foot history, the Halperin article, the Harkness articles, one of the Hilsman articles ("Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs"), both Hilsman books (1956; 1967), part of the Emmet Hughes memoirs, an article by Mr. Thomas Hughes ("Policy-Making in a World Turned Upside Down"), the Kent volume, possibly the forthcoming Kirkpatrick volume, parts of the Martin memoirs, the Millikan article, one of the Ransom volumes (1958; rev. ed. 1967?), the Robinson article, the Schlesinger and Sorenson histories, two of Admiral Taylor's articles ("Command and the Intelligence Process"; "The Importance of Intelligence to the Nation and the Navy"), and the five-part series in The New York Times (Tom Finney, et al). These are only a small sample of the useful materials.

Additional reflections on relationships between intelligence and policy-making could arise from the literature already available, or from personal experience, or both. Further discussion is in order, if only to counter such damaging tracts as that of Wise & Ross (The Invisible Government). One cause of past distortions may have been

the obscurity of the oversight and control mechanisms; in view of the recent literature, acknowledgment of various management and control devices might assist in restoring some semblance of reality to the discussions of intelligence roles in policy formulation and execution. The Ransom, Hilsman, and Kirkpatrick volumes may rectify many of the widespread misconceptions, but further analyses would be beneficial.

13. Intelligence Control

The term "intelligence control" is confusing, but having failed to create a better one, I shall stick with it. It is intended to connote at least some analogy to "arms control," and to some international ordering or delimiting of intelligence activities. The genesis of "intelligence control" thinking can be traced to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 1960 Summer Study at Endicott House, summarized in brief passages of the Schelling & Halperin volume on Strategy and Arms Control. Stauenfeild's Some Suggestions on the Perils of Espionage (1916) indicates a long tradition of aversion to espionage and its offspring, but little serious work has resulted in the intervening half century. Dr. Brennan's recent work on "selective information transfer" suggests at least one of the possibilities for a restructuring of the parameters of information available among states; such information transfer might restructure the scope and direction of clandestine intelligence collection, of "legal" and "illegal" networks, of deception practices, and, most obviously, of arms control inspection or verification requirements.

Serious works on ways and means of "damping" the "intelligence race" in other fields, notably in the "black operations" areas, appear to be altogether lacking. Considering the spread of "black operations" capabilities to the smaller and newly-emerging nations, the limited resources needed for the mounting of modest operations, and the failures of existing international institutions to effectively limit or regulate such behavior, or the transfer of techniques and resources for such purposes, one might at least favor serious attention to this troubling area. The literature on clandestine operations, on intelligence,

inspection and arms control, on legal aspects of intelligence activities, on paramilitary and resistance operations, and on strategy and intelligence options would appear to be relevant. How would such restraints and limitations as might be developed relate to arms control? What would be the roles of international restrictions? On first impression, these subjects raise difficulties more complicated than those related to arms control and disarmament, but such difficulties should not be met with the tactics of the ostrich.

14. Intelligence, Inspection and Arms Control

In view of international disagreements, discussions of inspection requirements in possible arms control measures are fashionable and frequently repetitive. Much of the literature is not included in this section, especially on such overdiscussed subjects as the limited test ban or proposed extended test ban. Among the works offering some useful observations on the roles and relationship of intelligence and inspection are: Abt's memorandum ("National Intelligence for Inputs to Inspection"), Abt, et al., whose Raytheon report on progressive zonal inspection has relevant parts, Brennan's "selective information transfer" proposal, Brennan's article ("The Role of Inspection in Arms Control"), parts of the Institute for Defense Analyses' Woods Hole Summer Study Report and Annexes, Iklé's RAND paper and article ("After Detection--What?"), the Lewis article, the McGuire volume, nearly all of the Phelps papers, the Piggott article, some of the Rodberg papers, parts of the Schelling & Halperin volume, and parts of the Westinghouse report.

Most of the above-cited literature treats intelligence and inspection relationships crudely; ignorance of intelligence requirements, capabilities and problems may combine with security considerations, the taboo against common-sense discussion of espionage, and apprehension of propaganda exploitation. As a result, much of the literature on inspection appears to be naive, erroneous in its assumptions of intelligence capabilities or their absence, and of slight utility. The Schelling & Halperin volume and some of the Phelps papers are at least suggestive of possible programs to understand some of the complicated relationships. Much

of the literature on inspection underestimates various intelligence capabilities; conversely, much of the literature assumes that a few reliable inspection "leads" to violations will sound the tocsin. In this connection, the Burton Marshall article ("Hide and Seek: Some Dour Thoughts on Inspection") is relevant. An immersion in the literature on "deception," on "erroneous intelligence," and on "security, counter-intelligence, and counter-espionage" might prove beneficial to those claiming knowledge of inspection requirements. Some of these problems may have received classified consideration, but a few sophisticated public analyses could vastly improve the quality of the literature on inspection requirements.

15. Legal Aspects of Intelligence Activities

This collection of materials is especially weak on matters of U.S. municipal law, both federal and state statutes, cases, and commentaries. It contains many of the public international legal materials, though the literature on traditional state practice, in treatises on diplomacy or espionage, and the literature on intervention far exceeds the materials in this section.

With regard to legal protections against foreign espionage, a study of the past practice and litigation might help to evaluate whether the present legislation is adequate, or whether it requires reform. Some attention might be devoted to possible legal means of protecting the intelligence and counter-intelligence communities from adverse disclosures in open court, dangers suggested by the disbanding of various prosecution efforts and by judicial proceedings in April and October 1966. On the other hand, some attention might be devoted to the legal protection of domestic society from improper employment of the new intelligence technologies. Audio surveillance technologies are presently under scrutiny, but other technologies may require eventual regulation.

The literature on public international law appears to suffer from an overdose of wishful thinking, visible over an extended tradition. Many of the writers whose works are not included in the present collection might benefit by an

immersion in the literature on "clandestine operations," "paper mills and forgeries, disinformation...," "paramilitary and resistance operations," and "strategy and intelligence options." Most of the legal commentators have a proclivity for establishing rules, and for shaking fingers at the practitioners of "black operations" whose work transgresses these hypothetical guidelines. Among those who have studied some relevant problems are Professors Baxter, Falk, Fisher, Friedmann, Garcia-Mora, Sohn, Stanger, Stone, Thomas, and Wright. Recognizing the inadequacy of past efforts, the American Society of International Law has supported a series of germane studies on the "role of international law in the regulation of civil wars," and these studies should be forthcoming. The role of international law, if any, in regulating various forms of clandestine assistance, subversion, or other forms of informal penetration (politely known to lawyers as "intervention"), and in establishing some form of "intelligence control" deserve attention also.

16. Organization and Oversight

This selection is highly incomplete and particularly weak on foreign intelligence organizations. One reason is the disparity between the reportage in the U.S. press and in foreign countries, particularly the communist states but also some of the others with traditions of discretion, England and France among others. On the organization of U.S. intelligence activities, Professor Ransom's Central Intelligence and National Security (1958) is still the best single volume available. Revision of obsolete sections on intelligence activities of the Defense Department provide opportunity for the correction of earlier errors. Harvard University Press will publish the revised edition, perhaps in 1967. A recent and accurate text on U.S. intelligence organization is Mr. Zlotnick's primer on National Intelligence, the 1964 edition incorporating changes subsequent to the 1960 version. For a description of the functions of the National Security Council in the intelligence and counter-intelligence arena, the authoritative study by James S. [redacted] and Robert H. Johnson, Organizational History of the National Security Council is must reading. For historical background, a report by Messrs. Bross and Sutherland and

FOIAb3b

other materials in the first two of the four-volume preliminary Eberstadt Task Force Report (November 15, 1948) are quite helpful, more so than the final report incorporated in the Hoover Commission materials. Also of note are the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings of 1947. The New York Times' team under Mr. Wicker presented some relevant data in the April 1966 intelligence series, as did Wise & Ross in The Invisible Government, amidst much questionable reporting. On DIA organization, a reading of U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 in conjunction with the Pentagon telephone directory should provide a basic introduction; on INR organization, a reading of Mr. Evans' "Research in Action" in conjunction with the State Department telephone directory might suffice. Other organizational data is available, with a modicum of research and analytical effort.

There is no comparable material on intelligence organizations of the Soviet Union. The Australian and Canadian royal commissions provide authoritative glimpses from the field, Professor Dallin offers a painstaking compilation, Mr. Deriabin gives helpful data, Mr. Garthoff an introductory summary ("The Soviet Intelligence Services"), Mr. Whaley a series of careful monographs, and Messrs. Wolin and Slusser a handy compilation --- none of which provides an adequate treatment. And the Penkovskiy materials, though helpful in matters of detail, fail to fill the void.

Even less material is available on British intelligence, though a careful reading of the fiction (much of the best coming from British writers) might yield data otherwise outlawed by the Public Records Act of 1958 (the so-called "Fifty Year Rule") and by the Official Secrets Act. Foot's volume on SOE in France stands alone in providing authoritative material on a now-defunct organization.

Excepting some interesting historical (and propaganda) materials from Taipei, including The Chinese Communist Secret Service and U. T. Hsu's The Invisible Conflict, no scholarly volume on Communist Chinese intelligence organizations, and their rôle in policy-making has been located. In view of the recent purges and reshuffling of personnel in 1966-1967, what scant material that is available may be, even now, partially obsolete. Among the noteworthy periodical literature on the subject are: Chen Shen-wen's "Peiping's Foreign Operations And Their Latest Line of Action," in Issues & Studies, and the Sterling & Jones article (+ charts) in Esquire, "From

China With Love," presenting data on intelligence agencies; Vincent King's A General Study of the Channels of Communication Between Communist China and the Western World, Peng-yao's article in Journalism Quarterly, Wang Chia-yu's article in Issues & Studies, Barton Whaley's Daily Monitoring of the Western Press...., and the Republic of China's Current Events Reference Materials (Nos. 177-178 on Chiang Kwei-lin's interrogation), on the New China News Agency (NCNA); Chen Li-chung's article in Chinese Communist Affairs, Mei Ko-wang's piece in Issues & Studies, and Wang Hsiao-tang's article in Chinese Communist Affairs, offering material on police and security systems. None of the above is definitive, though the Taipei materials and the Sterling & Jones article appear to benefit from governmental assistance.

Materials on East and West German intelligence organizations are many, but for the post-World War II period largely propagandistic. The Abshagen, Buchheit, Colvin, Fischer, Foot, Gehlen, Gerken, de Gramont, Hoettl, Jahn & Armin, Leverkuehn, Reile, Reitlinger, Schellenberg, and Wehner volumes provide some useful data and experiences.

Also of interest are Colonel Dewavrin's memoirs, for a description of French resistance organizations in World War II (now supplemented by Foot's history); the recent Ghanaian tract on subversion under Nkrumah; the recent Pike volume on Viet Cong organization; the State Department's North Korea study of 1951, released in 1961, and its A Threat to the Peace, Part II, both of which have relevant portions on intelligence organization. Many of the volumes listed under the "paramilitary and resistance operations," only some of which are included in this section, furnish additional data and observations on wartime intelligence organizations.

The available literature on the oversight, management, supervision and control of intelligence activities is meager and rather unsatisfactory. Those items which have been located are included with materials on organization, in part because organizational mechanisms are often crucial in oversight, and in part because the literature on organization frequently devotes at least passing attention to problems of intelligence oversight. Perhaps because, traditionally, the sovereign or executive of a state has dissociated itself from its central role in the oversight of intelligence activities, the public literature on the subject has remained in its murky, sparse, and frequently unreliable state. Reviewing the literature on oversight in the same order as that on organization, one finds the materials on oversight of the United States' intelligence community more explicit and forthright than available materials on other countries.

Ransom's Central Intelligence volume, in its 1958 edition, provided some cursory data on oversight; one expects that his forthcoming revised edition will provide the best single introduction available. In addition, the forthcoming Hilsman volume, To Move a Nation, has at least three parts which may be relevant: Part 2, "The Organizational Struggle;" Part 3, "JFK and the CIA;" and Part 10, "On the Making of Foreign Policy, Reflections on the Feasibility of Lessons." Perhaps Professor Kirkpatrick's book, due shortly from Macmillan, will provide additional material. Some of the U.S. congressional debates provide materials or oversight and views of its adequacy or inadequacy. Blackstock's The Strategy of Subversion includes materials suggesting some possible problems. As a result of the Wise & Ross volume, mis-titled The Invisible Government in 1964, public attention has focused on oversight machinery within the executive branch, notably in the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, the so-called "54-12" or "Special Group," and other control devices, confirmed in the April 1966 intelligence series of The New York Times (of which the final installment of April 29th deserves special attention). Some of the earlier authoritative works, such as the Zlotnick booklet of 1960 (slightly revised in 1964), are devoid of material on oversight (excepting occasional pious references to USIB, the NSC, the National Security Act of 1947, and the continued existence of that part of the Washington topography known as "Capitol Hill"). In view of the widespread misconceptions perpetuated by the Wise & Ross volume, the seemingly temporary détente in the U.S. Senate, and the necessity for acknowledgment of executive responsibility (e.g. Eisenhower in the U-2 incident of 1960, Kennedy after the Bay of Bigs endeavor of 1961) in the roughest of moments, one might expect that future works may include more authoritative data on executive oversight than those of the past. Already, the Jackson Subcommittee provides data on NSAM-124, NSAM-341, and SIG machinery.

On oversight of Soviet intelligence, the volumes mentioned in connection with organizational matters are the best available. They are far less satisfactory on matters of oversight than on matters of organization. The interlocking intelligence and security functions of the KGB and its predecessors, the role of the Central Committee apparatus, of the Politburo (formerly Presidium) and its various subcommittees, the influence of top party and government leaders, and many other key matters affecting the exercise of oversight responsibilities are so dimly visible as to leave even the careful reader in a state of confusion, ignorance, or both. In view of the Stalinist heritage and the inadequacies of oversight (as suggested in Khrushchev's "secret speech" of February 1956), it is at least understandable that Soviet writers have been reluctant, embarrassed, and possibly intimidated when contemplating explanation of oversight responsibilities and mechanisms. To date, they have offered almost nothing, at least nothing in the public domain.

Hansard's (H.C.) indices and transcripts, in combination with a careful reading of the Times, Williams' Not in the Public Interest, and the various Royal Commission reports listed in the "security" section of this bibliography provide at least a partial view of British oversight mechanisms and traditions, but hardly a satisfactory summary. The absence of much discussion in the press suggests that this form of oversight is less significant than in the United States, one offshoot being less visible oversight mechanisms.

In view of the sparse materials on Communist Chinese organizations, it is not surprising that almost nothing is available on the nature of Peking's oversight processes. Press reports, many of which are not collected in this section, and the volumes previously mentioned provide hints at oversight mechanisms in East and West Germany, but hardly provide adequate treatment. Oversight of French intelligence activities is hardly discernible from the items included in this section. Quite possibly an exhaustive review of the Assemblée Nationale debates, a careful collation of the daily press and media transcripts, study of various espionage trial records, and a scanning of the memoir literature would provide a fuller glimpse of oversight procedures and traditions than would result from a similar perusal of the relevant British materials. Occasional trials, press leaks, public relations and propaganda ventures, and other disclosures suggest some of the oversight mechanisms and problems affecting intelligence activities in more than 120 nations around the globe. Aside from national intelligence activities, there are materials on the organization and oversight of international information networks (the United Nations and other organizations), various religious networks (notably Vatican intelligence), private political networks, and even personal networks. This bibliography does not attempt to cover such activities, though their existence and activities may be of more than passing interest.

Studies on both organizational and oversight aspects of intelligence activities can be exceedingly useful — though usually less sensational and less saleable than the usual run of personal memoirs and supposed exposés. To date, U.S., and Soviet intelligence have been the subject of some serious public study, while Communist China, East and West Germany, France, Great Britain, Israel, the U.A.R., Indonesia, and various other nations engaged in extensive activities appear to have received inadequate attention. In the United States it might be most helpful to focus attention and resources on studies of Communist Chinese intelligence organizations, their rôles in policy-making and their relation to internal security organizations. A check with various experts and university research centers indicates that rich materials are available but insufficiently exploited, either because funds are not so allocated or because various university scholars prefer to study some of the more glamorous aspects of contemporary Chinese affairs.

Careful studies on national intelligence organizations would facilitate studies on techniques and problems of oversight. Once additional case studies are available, a careful comparative analysis of oversight practices might be exceedingly valuable. At the present time, however, a comparative analysis based on public materials alone would be a rather ambitious and hazardous undertaking. A less arduous venture, but a significant one, might be a study of United States oversight practices. None of the previous studies is definitive, and none of the scholarly volumes has focussed on oversight. As the periodical literature suggests, opinions on the appropriate rôles of executive, congressional, and press oversight vary widely. Professor Ransom's provocative book, Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? is possibly the most germane (if not the most satisfactory) of the available treatments, and should be read in conjunction with the revised edition of Central Intelligence and National Security.

17. Paper Mills and Forgeries, Disinformation, Propaganda, and Psywar

Materials in this section range widely in their purpose and utility; as a result, sources chosen from this section should be appraised and evaluated with utmost care. Some of these works are careful, scholarly, and honest studies; others are far less reliable. The task of evaluation is left to the reader. Although some of these materials appear to be the work of "paper mill" operators, examples of forgeries, propaganda, and psychological warfare techniques, others appear to be the work of honest and serious writers who have, in many cases unwittingly, been the targets of "disinformation" and who have, as a result, included much erroneous information in their volumes. But it would be erroneous and unfair to many honest authors for the reader to conclude that the authors of many volumes in this section are intentionally purveying false information.

The following materials provide an introduction to problems of paper mill operators and their products, forgeries and propaganda, disinformation and its targets: Blackstock's Agents of Deceit, including as an appendix an excerpt from the Congressional Record of September 28, 1965; the "Mischief-Makers" section of Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence; Wolfe's articles; Mr. Helms' presentation before the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on Communist Forgeries; the Natalie Grant (Mrs. Richard Wraga) piece on "Disinformation" in National Review; excerpts from Whiteside's New Yorker articles; Dr. Sager's 1965 volume, Moscow's Hand in India; and an anonymous piece in Est & Ouest (June 1-15, 1958) entitled, "Un 'historien' de l'école Bessedovsky — V. Alexandrov."

On propaganda and techniques of psychological warfare an ever-increasing volume of literature continues to be published. Much of it is of poor quality, and nearly as boring as the textual matter of its subject. Basic introductions are the volumes by Daugherty & Janowitz (eds.), Dyer, Holt & van de Velde, and Linebarger. Of more than passing interest are the contributions of Bartemeier, et al., Blackstock, Delmer, Hyde, Jaffe, Lockhart, MacDonald, Mégret, Molodiy, et al., Brewster Morgan, William J. Morgan, O'Brien, Penkovskiy, et al., Peterson, Reile, Schlesinger, Scott, Whitton, Zacharias, and Zhiveinov. Other standard works are included; the failure to specify the better ones is more reflective of the editor's evasion of the literature after a preliminary sampling than of the authors' knowledgeability. Some of the case studies and personal memoirs cited above, as well as many of the volumes on the underground press of World War II are exceptions to the frequently unappetizing menu.

In view of the steady flow of new books on propaganda, it would be foolhardy to ask for yet another. Despite the volume of items, a careful study on propaganda saturation and oversaturation might be in order. It might also tackle the question of counter-propaganda and its effectiveness, of non-verbal alternatives to propaganda in psychological operation programs, and possible criteria for measuring cost-effectiveness of alternative program packages. Another study might relate propaganda and psywar techniques to defection, re-defection, and counter-espionage operations; the results might be quite interesting.

In view of the increasing availability and effectiveness of information collection, reduction, storage, and retrieval techniques, the field of disinformation deserves further attention, in connection with the materials cited above, and those on "deception," "erroneous intelligence," and "security, counter-intelligence, and counter-espionage."

18. Paramilitary and Resistance Operations

The literature on this subject is of mixed quality, with notably fine work on World War II resistance operations emerging in the early and mid-sixties. On the postwar period the available works seem less accomplished, one reason being the inaccessibility of most primary source materials. At least partially satisfactory materials are available on resistance operations in the Second World War, conducted in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Corsica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Friesland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. Two aspects of the resistance literature deserve special attention: first, the recent history by Michael Foot, SOE in France deserves special note for its

forthright evaluations of SOE's operations, security, and net effect; second, the state of the literature on the obviously important resistance activities in Germany deserves attention. To date, the public works include a variety of personal memoirs and apologies, summaries of various resistance efforts (notably the plot of 20 July 1944), and some cursory accounts, mostly pamphlets, originating in Bonn; more detailed, but frequently propagandistic works arising from East Germany; similar materials emerging from the Soviet Union; and a smattering of memoir accounts from Allied quarters, such as Allen Dulles' The Secret Surrender. Considering that the more systematic accounts of the last decade are largely of communist origin and perspective, and notwithstanding political sensitivity in some quarters, a serious historical program in West Germany might well contribute to better understanding, at home and abroad, of resistance efforts in Germany, and their rôles in the history of the Third Reich.

Relevant to resistance operations, and to the previous section of this bibliography, is the literature on the underground press of World War II. Among the interesting volumes are Bindsloev's on the Danish press; Bellanger's and Michel & Mirkine-Guetzévitch's on the French press; Donkersloot's (Pseud: Donker), de Jong's, and Winkel's on the Dutch press; Luihn's on the Norwegian press; and Golka's and Miedza-Tomaszewski's on the Polish press.

Aside from the desirability of additional work on the resistance activities in Germany, noted above, the subject of World War II resistance activities offers rich materials for exploration. Natural interest, pride, and the passage of time may lead to additional volumes describing the activities inadequately covered at present.

Less happily, the literature on more recent events is frequently disappointing. Is there a single volume providing an incisive explanation of guerrilla or insurgency operations? Perhaps not. Among volumes of possible interest are works by Barber & Ronning, Cross, Eckstein, Kecskemeti, Lansdale, Modelski, Pike, Pye, Rosenau, Rostow, Andrew Scott, and Thayer. Classical doctrines and traditions may be found in Heilbrunn, Lawrence, Osanka, and, of course, the collected works of Mao Tse-tung, among others. Many well-known volumes on guerrilla warfare and the Vietnamese war are not included in the present bibliography. Bernard Fall's volumes and John Mecklin's, among others, may provide insights, but nothing definitive. It is frequently difficult to ascertain where intelligence functions are supplanted by military functions, and even more difficult to ascertain where intelligence functions should be supplanted by military functions. Some items which have been excluded are relevant, others which have been included may be irrelevant.

19. Personnel Policies

As suggested in the Wicker, et al. series of The New York Times, and the concluding analysis of April 29, 1966 in particular, personnel policies are crucial in the management and control of intelligence activities. On the "men at the top" available materials are usually highly superficial, and therefore of dubious value in assessing the performance of civilian vs. military executives, career vs. political appointees, professional or business or journalistic backgrounds. Very little is available to assess the men, or to gauge their performances. With respect to the staffing of intelligence organizations at — euphemistically — "the working level," at home and in the field, available materials are only slightly more satisfactory. Technological innovations notwithstanding, the personnel of an intelligence organization, as recruited, trained, assigned, supervised, and retired may be its most valuable asset, and its greatest liability. A corollary may be that, in view of the importance of personnel in determining an organization's effectiveness, the subject is likely to remain sensitive from the perspective of maintaining adequate security and protecting the delicate and evolving threads of personnel policies from outside scrutiny or interference. Available materials suggest that not until an organization is disbanded are judicious studies of its personnel policies likely to be forthcoming. Honest assessments of personnel abound in the literature on 16th, 17th, and 18th century intelligence activities (included in the sections on "clandestine intelligence," "clandestine operations," or "intelligence and policy-making"). Two volumes on now-defunct World War II organizations make significant contributions: Henry Murray and the assessment staff of OSS provide an account of their pioneering work in Assessment of Men (1948), and Michael Foot provides a brief but thoughtful chapter on SOE's "Recruiting and Training," in SOE in France (1966). Other experiences from wartime intelligence are Bingham's article, arising from World War I, another by the cautious "Captain Courageous" of World War II, and the reflections of Doob, Langer, Pettee, and Water. On more recent personnel policies, the observations of "Amory," Briggs, Daugherty & Janowitz (eds.), Dulles, "Felix," de Graaff, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Ransom, Rudd, Wicker, et al., Wise & Ross might be of interest. Various controversies respecting intelligence personnel policies receive attention in the pieces by Beals, Demaris, Denney, Donovan, Eisenhower, Hinckle, et al., Horowitz, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Lowe, Morse, Pool, and Silvert, inter alia.

Some aspects of personnel policies, recruitment, contracting and publication policies, security practices, allocation of "cover" overseas, and associated matters might benefit from public discussion. But a careful and forthright public study of personnel practices hardly seems feasible under present international conditions.

20. Public Information and Security Considerations

Among the more significant contributions to discussions of U.S. information and security policies are the Alsop brothers' chapter on "Defense Reporting" in The Reporter's Trade; Bagdigan's article, "Press Independence and the Cuban Crisis"; Beichman's "Behind Managed News"; Berkner's "Is Secrecy Effective?"; Cater's "Chronicle of Confusion" article, "News and the Nation's Security" article, and book on The Fourth Branch of Government; Cohen's book on The Press and Foreign Policy; Collins' article, "In Defence of the C.I.A."; Cutler's address on "Some Considerations Affecting the Publication of Security Information in Time of Propaganda War"; Daniel's address on "The Press and National Security"; Davis' article on "Security and the News"; Dulles' chapter on "Security in a Free Society," in The Craft of Intelligence; Feis' article on "The Shackled Historian"; Frankel's article, "Kennedy vs. the Press"; Green's articles, "Intelligence on a Silver Platter," and "Intelligence for Sale"; Gross' The Responsibility of the Press; Halperin's article on "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process"; Harrison's review, "That Massive Hidden Apparatus"; Hotz's editorials in Aviation Week; Howard's article, "Behind the Bureaucratic Curtain"; Howe's thesis on "Freedom of Speech and the National Security"; Keating's "My Advance View of the Cuban Crisis" article; Kennedy's address to the American News Publishers Association in April 1961; Korns' article on "Secrecy and Security"; parts of Lapp's books; Lyons' article; Mathews' book, Reporting the Wars; McConnell's paper; Monat's book, Spy in the U.S., particularly its chapters 8 & 9; Morgenstern's chapter on "The Security Process," in The Question of National Defense; Rabi's article on "The Cost of Secrecy"; Ransom's books, Can American Democracy Survive Cold War?, and Central Intelligence and National Security (particularly the forthcoming revised edition, contrasting U.S. and British practices), and three of Ransom's Harvard Defense Policy Seminar papers; Raymond's article, "Books on C.I.A. and Bay of Pigs Disturb Officials"; Reston's piece on "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy"; Rourke's book, Secrecy and Publicity, Dilemmas of Democracy; Rivers' thesis, "The Washington Correspondents and Government Information," and his subsequent book; Safer's article in Dateline, 1966; major portions of Salinger's With Kennedy; Shils' The Torment of Secrecy; parts of Sorenson's Kennedy; Summers' Federal Information Controls in Peacetime; various U.S. congressional reports, various U.S. Department of Defense directives; Wicker's review of Salinger's book; some of the Wicker, et al. articles in The New York Times; and Young's article, "Security and the Right to Know," in Military Review. Three forthcoming works of possible interest are Dovring's What is News in Newscasts and Newspapers? A Manual for a Troubled Public in an Age of So-Called Managed News; Hilsman's forthcoming book, To Move a Nation, and Kirkpatrick's forthcoming book, Intelligence in a Free Society.

Noteworthy materials on the problems of other nations include Beneyto's Ordenamiento jurídica de la información; Castberg's Freedom of Speech in the West; a comparative study of public law in France, the United States and Germany; Fraser's The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State & Their Monopoly of Licensed News; Hale's The Captive Press in the Third Reich; Harrison's article on "Government and Press in France During the Algerian War"; l'Institut International de la Presse's La Presse dans les États autoritaires; Léauté's Secret militaire et liberté de la Presse; Pinon's The Freedom of the Press; a critical evaluation of the totalitarian and liberal theories; Muggeridge's introduction to the "Whitwell" memoirs; Lord Radcliffe's Censors, and his Freedom of Information volume; Lord Shawcross' "The Shadow of the Law" article in Encounter; Siebert's Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776; the use and decline of government controls; Thomson's memoirs, Blue Pencil Admiral; and David Williams' Not in the Public Interest; the problem of security in democracy.

The present state of affairs would hardly seem satisfactory; perhaps attention to some of the outstanding problems would lead to more enlightened and effective government information policies, and a greater degree of cooperation from major segments of press and media than that observed in the past. On the comparative disadvantage of the United States in view of past practices and traditions, Gorokhoff's Providing US Scientists with Soviet Scientific Information and his Publishing in the USSR; Kononyhin's The Party and Soviet Press in the Period of the Great National War (in Russian); and Lyon's "The Information Asymmetry: Does It Exist and What Does it Mean?" paper suggest some disparities. Langelaan's Un nomme Langdon, translated as The Masks of War, suggests, in chapter 30, how important some seemingly trivial data may be, and Monat's Spy in the U.S., chapters 8 and 9, suggests who disseminates and who collects such data. For reminders of the efficient communist collection systems — though such reminders should hardly be necessary — Fang Tsao's "The 'Reference Information' of the Chinese Communists," in Chin jih ta lu (Mainland Today), King's A General Study of the Channels of Communication Between Communist China and the Western World, Kruglag's The Two Faces of TASS, and Whaley's Daily Monitoring of the Western Press in the Soviet Union and Other Communist States are indicative. This bibliography, in toto, provides at least some indication of the problem areas. A perusal of it may suggest that security and press restraints work exceedingly well in most instances; the poor quality and frequent unreliability of much of the literature may be among the indicia of effective security practices. On the other hand, the bibliography may suggest some serious problems, in confirmation of Pierre Salinger's observations in With Kennedy. Serious students of the subject might wish to consult additional literature listed under the sections on "deception," "economics of intelligence and counter-intelligence," "information management," "paper mills...," "public relations," and "security, counter-intelligence, and counter-espionage."

21. Public Relations

These materials are at least suggestive of the disparate public relations practices and policies of various nations and, within nations, of various agencies engaged in intelligence activities. Respecting the U.S. intelligence community, these materials indicate perhaps three clusters of public relations practice: (1) at the high-volume end of the spectrum, CIA stands alone; (2) in the middling group, the FBI, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department, the Secret Service, and possibly some of the military intelligence services stand in varied but related postures; and (3) at the low-volume end of the spectrum, DIA, NSA, AEC, and various other organizations able to maintain discipline and discretion stand largely untroubled by the attention attaching to the other end of the spectrum.

One result of the varying practices has been a focussing of attention upon CIA. A noteworthy article by Frederick W. Collins, "In Defence of the C.I.A.; Too Much Pious Hypocrisy," (November 1966), in The Round Table (January 1967) appears to defend CIA in all but its public relations policies. This article traces the development of a press tradition, from boasts of CIA's alleged rôle (along with SOE) in the overthrow of Iran's Premier Mossadegh in 1953 and through the Dulles era. This article fails to discern a doubling-back, sometime after the ill-fated press conference on the Soviet economy. Professor Blackstock's "CIA: A Non-Inside Report," in Worldview (May 1966) notes the downshifting of CIA public relations policies by at least 1965, a trend which may be viewed with some relief by many adherents of the low-volume policies.

Among relevant items are Stewart Alsop's article on "Organization Spies," Baldwin's on "CIA's Image Changes," Barzun's "Meditations on the Literature of Spying," Blanchard's "National myth, national character, and national policy: a psychological study of the U-2 incident," The Nation's "Brightening the Image; CIA Meets the Press," Cater's "Chronicle of Confusion," Deutsch's "Mass Communications" article, sections of Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence, Frankel's "My Spy Can Lick Your Spy" article, sections of de Gramont's The Secret War, the three-part Richard & Gladys Harkness series on and among "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Johnson's "Our Silent Partner..." article, Murphy's well-primed "Cuba: The Record Set Straight" article, Robinson's "They Fight the Cold War Under Cover" piece, Shuster's "C.I.A. Circulates Account of Itself" article, various U.S. government publications, Whitehead's The FBI Story, and a couple of the Wicker, et al. articles.

In view of widespread misunderstandings, the nature of various missions, and concerted efforts to undermine public confidence in CIA and other agencies (as suggested in Mr. Helms' presentation on

Communist Forgeries, supplemented by data which Rep. Price introduced into the Congressional Record on September 28, 1965), one should not expect relations with the public to be entirely satisfactory. Still, some organizations with difficult missions — DIA and NSA among them — manage without undue public relations problems. These, and other organizations (e.g. the British secret service) seem to overcome recruitment problems without resort to massive publicity, and to react in crisis (the NSA in 1960, for example) with at least a modicum of restraint.

Were there signs of innovation, of efforts to establish effective guidelines for and cooperation from the press, of discipline and restraint, one might be satisfied to leave CIA public relations problems to its internal damage assessments and experts. But a few doubts may remain, when the Director of Central Intelligence publishes a letter in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and when a retiring DCI continues the tradition of U.S. News & World Report pieces. Perhaps Professor Blackstock incorrectly sensed a new era of restraint; perhaps Mr. Collins, a journalist with excellent sources, correctly grouped the recent years of public relations policies with those of the Dulles brothers. Outside assistance could take two forms. First, an independent damage assessment, based on the available public sources. How effective is the disinformation peddled by General Agayants and Colonel Sidnikov of the KGB? How misleading is the Wise & Ross volume, The Invisible Government? What are the prevalent misconceptions of U.S. intelligence, at home and abroad? The sources are plentiful; they might be supplemented by public opinion surveys. If undertaken with care, such a study might help in assessing the degree to which past CIA policies, or their lack, have caused CIA's image and people's susceptibility to anti-CIA propaganda to impair the effective functioning of CIA, efforts of other organizations in the intelligence community, and the work of other U.S. departments abroad in the fulfillment of their missions. Hopefully, such a study would aid in restructuring images and misconceptions, and indirectly in the effective functioning of the intelligence community. Second, an independent probe of press practices might contribute to better understanding of public relations problems and to more effective press restraints aimed at the maintenance of proper security. This study might include careful interviewing of key members of the Washington press corps, of strategically placed foreign correspondents, of editors and publishers, of newspapers, magazines, wire-services, radio, television, and other information sources. It might help in establishing patterns of practice. When are intelligence stories news? Who is involved in the decisions to publish or not? What preconceptions and prejudices prevail? What arguments carry the day? Have some of the inconsistencies in past CIA policies (feeding material, directly and indirectly, while boasting of a policy of total silence, for example) affected the process for better or worse, in what way? What changes might improve the

images of CIA? To what extent would the diminution of CIA publicity shift attention to other intelligence agencies or to those officials of the executive branch responsible for supervision of intelligence functions? Answers to some of these questions might be forthcoming, and might provide an impetus to improvements in public relations policies.

22. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

These materials hardly convey the technological innovations which one would expect in the S & T intelligence arena. Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence is unusually circumspect in chapter 6, "Collection—When the Machines Take Over." Goudsmit's ALSOS, Story of a Mission is of indirect interest, as is Irving's The Mare's Nest. Lasby's Ph.D. dissertation, "German Scientists in America: Their Importation, Exploitation, and Assimilation, 1945-1952," and his article, "Project PAPERCLIP," are of interest. Minaev's The Secret Becomes Known (in Russian) has a section summarizing U.S. developments, in propagandistic fashion. Simons' "Spies that can't feel the Cold," Wicker, et al., and Zlotnick provide a few relevant passages. Two articles of R. V. Jones entitled "Scientific Intelligence" deserve special attention; they are among the small body of literature on the subject, and written by one of the foremost authorities.

23. Security, Counter-Intelligence, and Counter-Espionage

Among noteworthy items are: Colonel Abel's article; the Abshagen biography; the "Amory" volume; Bakeless' book; Bartemeier, et al., especially part 3 on "Forceful Indoctrination"; Beck & Godin's volume; parts of Blackstock's The Strategy of Subversion; the Bonsal Report; Boveri's book; Brown's volume; Collins' The FBI in Peace and War; the Dallin & Mavrogordato article; Dourlein's Inside North Pole; sections of Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence; Einstein's history; Eisenhower's memoirs, volume I, chapter 13; "Felix's" chapter on "C.E. Versus Security, and Other Devilry"; Foot's SOE in France; parts of Foote's Handbook for Spies; Frischauer's The Man Who Came Back; parts of de Gramont's The Secret War; Hoover's Masters of Deceit; Huss's Red Spies in the U.N.; In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer; Johnson's An Instance of Treason; Kinkead's book; Klein's The Counterfeit Traitor; Latham's history; the Lay & Johnson organizational study, for a glimpse of U.S. security community organization; Levine's article; the Lewis (Mrs. Gruson) biography; Senator Long's book; chapter 30 in the Langelaan memoirs; chapters 7 & 8 in the Monat story; Moorehead's book; the Morros memoirs; the Noel-Baker survey; chapter 4 of Dean Price's Government and Science; Lt. Col. I. Y. Prikhodko's lecture, among other relevant parts of The Penkovskiy Papers; Reitlinger's The SS, Alibi of a Nation; Schellenberg's memoirs; chapter 4, on "Disloyalty, Ideology, and

Informal Access," in Scott's The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration; Shils' The Torment of Secrecy; the Spingarn & Lehman article; Thorwald's book; the Trefousse article; parts of Truman's memoirs, volume II; at least five reports on security from the U.K.; various U.S. congressional materials, including a few reports of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and many more useful reports of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, only a few of which are listed; a section of the State Department's Foreign Relations, 1942, Volume V on "efforts to Counteract the Work of Axis Espionage Agents"; chapter 11 of Watt's Personalities and Policies; West's The Meaning of Treason, both the original and revised editions, the latter being published by Viking as The New Meaning of Treason; Whitehead's The FBI Story; Whiteside's book; and Wilson's study on Cold War Diplomacy.

Much of the literature on security problems is disappointing; the literature on counter-intelligence activities is sparse; and the literature on counter-espionage almost non-existent, excepting various case studies and narratives on a mixed batch of double-agents, triple-agents, and a few others. Conspicuously missing is a solid volume delineating an effective security and counter-intelligence doctrine — perhaps a counterpart to Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. A thoughtful study might consider the effects of technological innovations upon collection capabilities and relative costs; the economics of intelligence, C.I., C.E., deception, and counter-deception; effects of automation upon information processing, reduction, storage, retrieval and utility, and possible generation of new categories of sensitive information as one result, possible elimination of other categories as another; relative priorities among various security programs, C.I., C.E., disinformation and deception operations; criteria for press and media restraints which might be palatable to press and public, while drastically raising the cost and/or reducing the reliability of the critical data now being obtained in conjunction with systematic perusal of the western press; procedures for C.I. and C.E. practices which would allow exploitation of the most modern technologies while ensuring that such technologies will not be turned to unconstitutional or unwise interference in domestic society. Perhaps some of these issues could not be tackled in open publication; hopefully most are within the realm of public inquiry. A forthright and sensible volume might lead, indirectly, to improved allocation of security and counter-intelligence resources. Just as important, it might produce greater understanding and cooperation within that segment of the press and media which assists in reducing the cost, and time, while raising the reliability of our adversaries' intelligence efforts, usually unwittingly.

24. Strategic Intelligence

Items under this category include many on strategic reconnaissance, by airplane, satellite, or otherwise. Traditionally, the field of reconnaissance has been considered part of military affairs, usually part of tactical intelligence efforts. Various aspects of reconnaissance remain relevant to "tactical intelligence" and are included under that section, but unless there appears to be a distinct relevance to military combat these materials are included with those on other aspects of strategic intelligence, in this section. Also included in this section are materials on surprise, sometimes overlapping with the "erroneous intelligence" materials. Central to this section are the works, however inadequate, on strategic intelligence doctrine and the roles of strategic intelligence in the processes of government.

Among the volumes shedding some light on the functions and roles of strategic intelligence are Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence, disappointing on this subject considering the author's wide ranging experience; Hilsman's Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, interesting and provocative, but also disappointing; Hilsman's forthcoming book, To Move a Nation, interesting but somewhat tangential; Kent's Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, probably the best available, however obsolete; McGovern's Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow, with a title more promising than its contents; Pettee's The Future of American Secret Service, interesting primarily as an example of early post-war thought; Ransom's Central Intelligence and National Security, a revised edition of which is forthcoming, providing explicit and implicit strategic intelligence doctrines; and Zlotnick's National Intelligence, the 1964 edition indicating only slight change in Zlotnick's thinking since the 1960 edition. A handful of articles are of more than passing interest: two by Evans , one by Hilsman, one by Kendall, and one by Taylor. Especially disappointing are Orlov's Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, nearly all of General Platt's writings, and a few other works included in this section. As the above commentary suggests, the definitive volume on strategic intelligence has yet to be written.

25. Strategy and Intelligence Options

This section contains just a few pieces of important literature. Many volumes might be added without dramatically improving the quantum of relevant thought. The Kahn paper, for example, says briefly what is viewed in varying perspectives and in varying (upwards!) lengths in such volumes as On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation. Four items deserve special attention: Professor Huntington's Instability at the Non-Strategic Level, Professor Kissinger's chapter, "Limited War: Deterrence?" in Nuclear Weapons and

Foreign Policy, Professor Scott's chapter on "Internal Violence as an Instrument of Cold Warfare," in Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife, and Professor Scott's book, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration. This last item requires explanation, because its initial publication as a paperback in Random House's political science series consigned it to immediate obscurity. To date there have been no reviews of it, at least none known to Professor Scott. Though hardly definitive, it is one of the more important volumes of recent years. It helps to explain some of the options and techniques which are available among states, and presumably exercised among them.

As the superpowers achieve thermonuclear postures threatening destruction at heretofore unavailable levels, and as nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems spread to additional states, the strategic options available among states may undergo changes. As the means of communication and transportation spread, and as the availability and utility of intelligence increase, options below the threshhold of violence or among the more modest of violent levels may be increasingly tempting, if only because more identifiable, visible and violent levels may become increasingly unpalatable. To what extent have limited wars become unpalatable? To what extent may various insurgency and counter-insurgency situations, "wars of national liberation" and the like, become unpalatable? Or palatable but less desirable than more modest forms of influence, of penetration, of control? Shifts in options are far from clear, just as their consequences are far from clear. What might be the consequences for arms control, nation states, alliances, international institutions? Though the answers may remain uncertain, strategic options and their relationship to intelligence requirements and intelligence missions deserve further attention.

26. Tactical Intelligence

Among the more interesting items are: Beecher's article, "Computers Help to Thwart Enemy"; Engineering Captain Dem'yanov's article on "Antisubmarine Warfare"; General Ford's article on "Tactical Reconnaissance"; Glass & Davidson's Intelligence is for Commanders; Colonel Galkin's provocative article, "Some of the Special Features of Knowing the Processes of Armed Conflict," which some will argue has no place in a collection on tactical intelligence; Colonel Heymont's Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare; S. L. A. Marshall's Men Against Fire and The River and the Gauntlet; Masters' article, "Minimizing Uncertainty"; Colonel Porter & Major von Platen's "Reconnaissance in COIN" article; Admiral Taylor's "Command and the Intelligence Process"; Townsend's RISKS, The Key to Combat Intelligence; Sun Tzu's The Art of War; chapter 5, "Information in War," in von Clausewitz's On War; Colonel Wackwitz's "Jet-Speed Intelligence, Part I: Tools of Command"; and Colonel Walters' "Airborne Long Range

Input or ALRI." A variety of newspaper accounts, television reports, and occasional articles, such as Frank Harvey's on "The Air War in Vietnam," in Flying, suggest that the Vietnamese war is producing innovations and experiences which will reshape tactical intelligence and necessitate new works incorporating the new wisdom.

27. Technological Innovations

Many of the materials in this section are relevant to materials in the "public information and security considerations." Most technological innovations are unfit for public discussion, except in the vaguest way, and some of the materials in this section indicate less than sound judgment. In view of the availability of many items, general discussions of technological innovations, their direct and indirect effects, might be appropriate. Among the more interesting items are Abt, et al., Final Report...PROZID, Vol. II; Captain Antonov's article on "Radars With Programmed Electronic Scanning"; General Beach's "R & D Looks to the Seventies"; Colonel Beloborodov's "Aerial Photographic Interpretation of Ships"; Bennett, et al., Military Information Systems: The Design of Computer-Aided Systems for Command; Davis, et al., Arms Control Simulation, Appendix B; "ESD's O'Neill: Airborne Platforms Herald New Flexibility in Military Information Systems"; Gelinas & Genoud's A Broad Look at the Performance of Infrared Detectors; various articles by Engineering Colonel Goncharenko; Gordon & Helmer's Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study; Haun's article on "Advances in Lasers and Masers"; Holahan's article on "The Future of Radar"; Colonel Hughes' article on "The Next Decade in Computer Development"; Knapp's "Laser Throws a New Light"; Lovell's historical but interesting Of Spies and Stratagems; Moeschl's "Jet-Speed Intelligence, Part II: Datamation"; Nikolaev's "Photo and Television Means for Aero-Space Reconnaissance"; Pursglove's "Electronics Expands Vision of Sky Spies"; General Schriever's "Project Forecast Envisions a New Era of Technology, Not a Plateau"; Sokolov's "Bionics and Control Systems"; Swanson's "Information Sciences: Some Research Directions"; Von Neumann's "Can We Survive Technology?"; Wicker, et al., "C.I.A. Spies From 100 Miles Up; Satellites Probe Secrets of Soviet"; and Zuckerman's Scientists and War, The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs, including its reprint of his earlier article on "Judgment and Control in Modern Warfare," and his view of computers. What will be left to the human individual, in terms of tasks and independence, after several additional decades of technological onrush is hardly clear at present. Answers to less sweeping issues may well impinge upon security requirements. Rather than encourage too detailed discussion of forthcoming technologies, one might propose a volume on strategic intelligence updating Dr. Kent's contribution in 1949, and referring where possible to recent and projected technological innovations.